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INTRODUCTION
Emerging market countries suffered a string of severe macroeconomic crises between 1997 and 2001 starting with East Asia and then continuing with Russia (1998) , Brazil (1998-99) , Argentina and Turkey (2000-01) . These crises coincided with a period of growing external financial integration. In spite of the reforms subsequently undertaken, few economists would have predicted that developing countries, emerging market and non-emerging market alike, would perform as well as they did during the Great Recession of 2008-09 and accompanying global financial crisis.
2 Not only did developing countries display considerable resilience during the crisis of 2008-09, their economic take-off, including the most populous countries China and India, has gradually led to more than half of PPP-adjusted global GDP being produced by these countries by 2010. In this sense, the crisis of 2008-09 is a tectonic shift that could unravel Bretton Woods II (BW II) and herald a move from a US-centric towards a multi-polar world.
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A widely prevalent view before the Great Recession was that global imbalances, epitomized by the current account deficits of the US funded by the surpluses of China and other emerging market economies, supported the growth of emerging markets in a sustainable way.
BW II viewed global imbalances as a win-win configuration --the allegedly superior financial intermediation of the US absorbed the excess savings of the rapidly growing countries, facilitating their growth as the US became the demander of last resort. Accordingly, the dollar standard of BW I continued its operation in a modified world of growing financial and trade integration, with the US the provider of global liquidity and global insurance services to emerging markets. The massive accumulation of international reserves (IR) was seen as the counterpart of the BW II system, whereby the US benefited from the "exorbitant privilege" of funding its fiscal and current account deficits at a lower cost, while China enjoyed export led growth. Financial liberalization and integration were viewed as a win-win process, consistent with the operations of the above regime.
With the Great Recession and global financial crisis of 2008-09 raising profound questions about the efficacy of international capital markets and the inadequate regulation even of sophisticated financial systems like that of the US, this paper provides an overview of the policy lessons from the crisis, and the impact of financial policies and capital mobility on the growth and 2 See for example, Development Committee (2010) . 3 The Bretton Woods System or BW I was set up 1944 to deal with post World War II challenges. This was a period when Western Europe and the US engaged in growing trade integration while maintaining capital controls. The collapse of BW I in the early 1970s coincided with a rapid financial integration of the OECD countries. This was followed by the financial opening of emerging markets in the 1990s, leading to a rapid increase in their demand for international reserves and, according to Dooley et al. (2003) , to the emergence of BW II.
stability of emerging markets and the global economy. The paper starts with a selective review of the literature on financial globalization and growth. It then continues with the response of both the industrialized and developed countries to financial globalization, pointing out the stark differences. This discussion is organized around the macroeconomic trilemma, or the idea that countries can choose at most two out of the following three: an open capital account (financial integration); independent monetary policy; and a fixed exchange rate.
Next comes a review of the large accumulation of international reserves (IR) by emerging market countries. BW II is only one explanation. Arguably, the global crisis has chipped away at the credibility of the BW II, US-centric interpretation of global financial intermediation. We also discuss other explanations for IR accumulation like the buffer stock argument, mitigation of real exchange rate volatility, mercantilism reflecting concerns about relative competitiveness, and self-insurance against foreign and domestic shocks. Self-insurance with an added emphasis on financial stability and putting the fiscal house in order emerges as the most convincing explanation in a second-best world.
The discussion on IR accumulation is followed by outlining a public finance approach to financial integration based in large part on the actual response of emerging markets to their crises of [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . A provocative hypothesis is that the global crisis of 2008-09 means that the financial sector in OECD countries may have grown beyond socially desirable levels, pitting those who would reform it with a view to restricting its untrammeled growth against those with vested interests in a minimum of regulation and publicly funded bailouts; while the comparative resilience of developing countries is a tribute to the corrective measures they took after their own crises of [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . The paper ends with a summary of policy conclusions.
LITERATURE SURVEY
This selective survey is divided into two parts: the links between financial globalization and growth on the one hand and macroeconomic crises on the other.
Financial Globalization and Growth
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Expectations and optimism were rife at the beginning of the 1990s that growing financial integration would speed up growth in developing countries and help with income convergence.
The channel through which this would happen would involve global savings being channeled into investment in capital-scarce developing countries. Aizenman, Radziwill and Pinto (2004, 2007 )-APR-examined whether there was any increase in the extent to which the domestic physical stock of capital in developing countries was financed by foreign savings consequent upon growing financial integration. They constructed a "self-financing ratio" for the period 1991 to 2001 using a 10-year horizon for 47 developing countries and 22 OECD countries using data for the period 1981-2001. The first step was to derive an estimate of the capital stock in year t minus 10 using the national income accounts. The next step was to add the cumulative national investment over the 10-year period to this initial capital stock, and then divide this by the initial capital stock plus the cumulative national savings over the same period to obtain the selffinancing ratio, with suitable adjustments made for depreciation. 5 The purpose was to see how the self-financing ratio varied over the 1990s in response to growing financial integration and to compare the 2001 ratio with that in 1991.
APR's main findings were first, that the average self-financing ratio for developing countries did not change much over the 1990s, global financial liberalization notwithstanding.
Second, there did not seem to be a growth bonus associated with greater external financing of the domestic capital stock. To the contrary, countries with higher self-financing ratios grew significantly faster. Third, more volatile self-financing ratios were associated with lower growth; but this result disappears when a proxy for the quality of institutions was included in the crosscountry regressions. But the strong, asymmetric effect of self-financing on growth remained: a rise in the self-financing ratio from 1.0 to 1.1 was associated with increasing the average per capita growth, from 2.8 percent to 4.4 percent, while a drop from 1.0 to 0.9 lowered per capita growth from 2.8 percent to 2.2 percent.
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Self-financed growth is not a new idea. Feldstein and Horioka (1980) wrote a seminal paper asking how internationally mobile capital really was. In regressing national investment rates on national savings rates for 21 OECD countries using data from 1960 to 1974, they consistently found coefficients close to 1.0 and stable over time. These results were evocative of a closed economy, suggesting capital was not as mobile across borders as might have been assumed; if it were, one would expect a close to zero correlation between national saving and national investment. This finding became enshrined as the "Feldstein-Horioka puzzle" and is evocative of home biases and self-financed growth. In a paper related to APR, Prasad, Rajan and Subramanian (2007) -PRS-examined the links between capital flows and growth in the financially globalized 1990s. The starting point of their enquiry was twofold: the perverse flow of capital from poor to rich countries; and the 5 For details and caveats, see Aizenman, Pinto and Radziwill (2004, 2007) . 6 If the country is on average running current account surpluses, the self-financing ratio would exceed 1. 7 It would of course be a genuine puzzle only if there were no legal restrictions on capital flows across countries. In other words, F-H were testing de facto capital mobility. See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) for further discussion of the various F-H interpretations.
allocation puzzle of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) , namely, that within the group of developing countries, net capital inflows tend to find their way to the slower-growing countries. Against this background, PRS found a positive correlation between average current account balances and average growth rates for developing countries after controlling for the standard growth determinants during 1970-2000. Moreover, they find that this correlation was driven more by savings than investment: when savings-to-GDP is included in the growth regression, the coefficient on the current account balance dropped to zero but remained virtually unchanged when the investment rate was included (recall the accounting identity national savings =current account surplus plus investment), suggesting the dominant role of savings.
The explanation PRS favor about why savings are positively correlated with growth is that financial systems tend to be under-developed in developing countries. So not all the savings are intermediated into investment and part of it gets parked abroad via current account surpluses,
leading to an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. Alternatively, foreign exchange reserves get built up either because countries want to avoid overvaluation or because they want a cushion against the volatility of capital flows.
The preceding results fly in the face of neoclassical economics, according to which capital should flow from rich to poor countries in order to equalize per capita incomes. One reason this may not happen is that expected marginal returns may not be higher in poorer countries even though they have lower capital-to-labor ratios either because of low total factor productivity or high risk or both. But even in a situation where marginal returns are higher in poorer countries, the welfare benefits of financial integration may be limited. Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) examined financial integration in a calibrated neoclassical model and found that the welfare gains in switching from financial autarky to full capital mobility equal a paltry 1 percent increase in domestic consumption for the typical non-OECD country. This should come as a dampener to economists who may have advocated capital account openness as a way of speeding up income convergence.
The truly compelling point in Gourinchas-Jeanne is that financial integration will have a significant impact on welfare only if it contrives to substantially bridge the gap between the levels of total factor productivity in poor and rich countries-which goes substantially beyond simply equalizing growth rates or even the marginal returns to capital. For example, Gourinchas-Jeanne find that if financial integration eliminated 25 percent of the productivity gap with the US, the welfare gains for the prototypical developing country would be 50 times larger than that in the standard neoclassical model.
The big question therefore is whether financial integration can help bridge this gap and if so, what the channels would be. For example, foreign direct investment could help narrow productivity gaps through technological spillovers; but it is far from obvious that letting foreign portfolio investors into the stock market or government treasury bill market in developing countries can do this. In other words, the type of financial inflow matters, a point looked at in a detailed, disaggregated fashion by Aizenman and Sushko (2011a) . They examined the differential impact of portfolio debt, portfolio equity, and FDI inflows on 37 manufacturing industries, 99 countries over 1991-2007, extending the Rajan-Zingales (1998) methodology. Net portfolio debt inflows were found to be negatively associated with growth during the mid 1990s.
The magnitudes of the negative effect of surges in portfolio debt inflows on growth were substantial in the late 1990s for a number of countries. The effect of debt inflows on growth in the 2000s was rather muted. Surges in portfolio equity inflows also exhibit a negative association with aggregate growth in the manufacturing sector. 8 Equity inflows exhibited economically significant positive impact on the growth of financially constrained industries, unlike their negative impact on the average manufacturing growth rate. FDI inflows exhibited a positive association with aggregate manufacturing growth during most of the sample period, both at the aggregate level and specifically for the industries in need of external financing.
Financial Globalization and Crises
As a point of transition between financial integration and its links with growth versus crisis, we start with the main findings in the burgeoning literature on conditions conducive to growth acceleration and economic takeoffs [see Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2005) and Aizenman and Spiegel (2010) , and the references therein]. This literature has been motivated in part by the growing global weight of emerging-market economics and the growing gap between nonemerging developing and the emerging market countries. Is financial integration conducive to sustainable takeoffs and economic growth? Aizenman and Sushko (2011b) suggest a rich and complex marginal association between various capital flows and economic takeoffs. Higher FDI inflows are associated with a higher takeoff probability relative to zero FDI inflows, and this effect is highest for the Latin America subsample. In contrast, a higher stock of short-term external debt has been associated with a substantial negative effect on the probability of a takeoff, and the cumulative effect of the short-terms debt overhang is largest for Latin American
countries. Yet, virtually all the takeoffs were associated with a rise in portfolio debt inflows. This effect is substantial for Latin America, while it is virtually absent in Sub-Saharan Africa. The association between financial links through portfolio equity flows and takeoffs is negative.
The analysis of the duration of takeoffs shows that higher net portfolio debt inflows increase it while the opposite is true of equity inflows. In contrast, higher net FDI inflows at the time of the takeoff are associated with a lower probability that the takeoff will be sustained. This finding parallels that of Prasad, Rajan, and Subramanian (2007) and balance sheet problems (East Asia in particular, also Argentina and Turkey, with liabilities, often short-term, denominated in US dollars and assets in local currency).
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If any set of countries stood a chance of benefiting from financial integration, surely the European Union accession countries would qualify because of the financial, product and factor 9 One interpretation of this result is that countries in which the economic takeoff is driven by FDI inflows converge to a new steady state faster, resulting in a shorter duration of high growth rates. Alternatively, "green" FDI may compete for financing with domestic firms, crowding incumbent firms out of local bank lending, especially if the domestic financial industry is not sufficiently developed. 10 For case studies, see Serven and Perry (2005) on Argentina, Pinto and Ulatov (2011) on Russia. An overview is contained in Gill and Pinto (2005) . Aizenman and Sun (2009) document the key role of balance sheet exposure in explaining the use of international reserves by half of the emerging markets during the crisis. See also Eichengreen Hausmann and Panizza (2003) for a discussion of the implications of balance sheet exposures on the vulnerability of developing countries. market integration bolstered by the superior institutional pull of the EU. But even here hangs a cautionary tale, compellingly illustrated by the experience of the Euro periphery countries, Greece and Portugal. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) argued that the large current account deficits they were running at the turn of the millennium were consistent with neoclassical income convergence. These deficits could be explained by higher returns to capital in these capitalscarce, poor countries relative to the Euro Area average, which would propel investment. In addition, higher expected growth would tend to increase consumption in line with the permanent income hypothesis and lower savings. Both factors would lead to larger current account deficits.
Empirically, the authors found a growing positive link over time between income and current account balances in the euro area, with the rise in the current account deficits of the poorer countries driven more by a decline in private savings than an increase in investment-a pattern replicated in Greece and Portugal. They also found a decline in the cross-country correlation between savings and investment in the euro area, concluding that "At least for this last group, the Feldstein-Horioka phenomenon appears to have largely disappeared." (Blanchard and Giavazzi B-G 2002 p. 149) . Since the large current account deficits of Greece and Portugal were driven by convergence and integration, B-G argued that there was no immediate cause for worry.
In contrast to Greece and Portugal (but in keeping with self-financed growth) B-G noted IMF (2008) chapter 6 discusses the sharp contrast between the persistent current account surpluses in emerging Asia and the current account deficits in emerging Europe, and the sustainability of both. The experience of Greece and Portugal indicates that even seemingly benign current account deficits pose the risk of a build up of serious vulnerability over time.
manifestation was the building up of IR-although, as we shall see, other equally important measures were taken.
DEVELOPING COUNTRY RESPONSE TO MACROECONOMIC VULNERABILITY
Putting the crises of the 1980s and the 1990s together, emerging markets have been on a steep learning curve. In this section we link financial stability to the broader context of the macro tradeoffs facing emerging markets and developing countries. In the 1980s, most emerging markets operated with low financial integration and rampant capital controls, strong preferences for exchange rate stability, relatively low levels of international reserves-to-GDP ratios, and active monetary policy. These patterns were modified substantially during the 1990s and 2000s.
Navigating the trilemma
A compact way of capturing the response of developing countries is to base it on the macroeconomic policy trilemma. This trilemma, or the ability to accomplish at most two out of following three policy objectives -financial integration, exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy-is a key implication of the Mundell-Fleming macroeconomic framework. A lingering challenge in applying it is that, in practice, most countries rarely face the binary choices 12 The analysis was applied to a panel of the trilemma indices of 50 countries (32 of which are developing countries) during 1970-2006 period for which there is a balanced data set (the requirement of a balanced panel reduced the number of countries in the sample substantially). The study applies a linear regression, testing the hypothesis that the linear sum of the three indices (without a constant term) adds up to a positive constant, where all the regression coefficients are positive. The regression analysis confirms this hypothesis, with R 2 well above 0.9, for three sub-groups: Industrial Countries, Non-Emerging Developing Countries, and Emerging Market Countries. The overall results are robust to the possibility of allowing structural, endogenously determined breaks in the data (the years of 1973, 1982, 1997-98, and 2001 were identified as candidates for structural breaks, and tested for the equality of the group mean of the indexes over the candidate break points for each of the subsample groups). 14 Not surprisingly, industrialized countries have achieved higher levels of financial openness throughout the period. The acceleration of financial openness in the mid-1990s remained significantly higher than the cross-country average of both the full sample and developing non-emerging markets subsample. For emerging markets, there has been a marked trend towards financial openness after 1990, but only after some retrenchment during the 1980s.
This would appear to be the big difference between emerging markets and developing, nonemerging markets. Indeed, the main take away from the perspective of the discussion which follows is that emerging market countries sharply increased their financial openness after 1990 while settling for moderate levels of exchange rate flexibility and monetary policy independence.
Building up International Reserves
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Despite the proliferation of greater exchange rate flexibility for developing countries noted above, the ratio of international reserves to GDP has increased substantially, as shown in 13 When the euro countries are removed from the industrialized countries sample, the extent of the divergence from the average becomes less marked although there is still a tendency among the non-euro countries to move toward lower levels of monetary independence. 14 The trend of the non-euro industrialized countries after the late 1990s more or less traces that of developing countries though it is a little more volatile. 15 This section draws on Aizenman (2011). (Fischer 2001) . Absent sufficient reserves, balance of payments deficits would have to be corrected through sharp contractions in investment and consumption, thereby inducing recessionary pressures. This rule of thumb gave way to the cost-benefit calculus of the buffer stock approach, which in turn was replaced by the GuidottiGreenspan rule. Guidotti-Greenspan culminated in self-insurance as financial considerations became dominant and the growing exposure of emerging markets to sudden stops and capital flight crises increased the demand for IR as a cushion against financial instability. We review this evolution.
Buffer stock approach
The early literature focused on IR as a buffer stock in supporting an adjustable-peg or managed-floating exchange-rate regime. Heller (1966) was the first to derive the optimal level of reserves using a cost-benefit approach. 16 Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) reformulated
Heller's approach in an optimal inventory management framework balancing the macroeconomic adjustment costs incurred in the absence of reserves, or when reserves get exhausted, with the opportunity cost of holding reserves. Extensions of the buffer stock model predict that average optimal reserves depend negatively on the opportunity cost of reserves, and exchange rate flexibility; and positively on GDP, adjustment costs, and reserve volatility, driven frequently by the underlying volatility of international trade. Overall, the literature of the 1980s supported these predictions (Flood and Marion 2002) .
Guidotti-Greenspan Rule
The financial integration of the 1990s made the reigning measures of reserves adequacy based on trade flows obsolete as more volatile financial flows became dominant. The presumptive candidate advanced as the new measure of adequate reserves was the GuidottiGreenspan rule advanced in 1999: reserves needed to match short-term external debt (defined as total external debt with an original or remaining maturity less than a year plus interest due).
Such a level would provide the central bank with the needed liquidity to meet the demand for foreign currency if a sudden stop prevented external refinancing of the short-term debt. Back-ofthe-envelope calculations suggests that the expected benefit of following the Guidotti-Greenspan rule is about 1 percent of GDP if holding reserves equal to short-term external debt reduced the annual probability of a sharp reversal in capital flows by 10 percent (in line with Rodrik and Velasco (1999) , Rodrik (2006) ), and if the output cost of a financial crisis is about 10 percent of GDP, as found by Hutchison and Noy (2006) . Similar results have been obtained using more elaborate models (Garcia and Soto (2004) ; Jeanne and Ranciere (2006) ).
One challenge to the Guidotti-Greenspan rule came from the concern that it focused on exposure to external volatility in the form of a sudden stop in capital inflows. Yet, policy makers may also accumulate reserves as a buffer against internal volatility. Domestic instability may trigger internal conflicts, leading to "sudden capital flight." In these circumstances, the private sector would opt to swap domestic currency assets with assets denominated in foreign currency (Calvo (2006) ). Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor (2010) found that the liquid liabilities of the banking system as measured by M2 provide a good proxy for the domestic exposure to such liquidation shocks. A higher ratio of international reserves to M2 would provide a thicker cushion, thereby reducing the adverse effects of sudden capital flight on the real exchange, and possibly even reducing the probability of a sudden capital flight crisis in the first place (to the extent that such a crisis has a self-fulfilling element). . 17 This debate led to the notion of self-insurance. But before we go discuss selfinsurance as a prime motive for reserve accumulation, we present its rival, the mercantilist view.
Mercantilism and relative competitiveness
The views linking the large increase in hoarding reserves to growing exposure to sudden stops associated with financial integration face a well-known contender in a modern incarnation of mercantilism (Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber 2003) . According to this interpretation, reserve accumulation is a by-product of promoting exports, which is needed to create better jobs, 
Self-insurance
Self-insurance is a natural progression in the debate about whether emerging markets hold excessive reserves. Deeper financial integration of developing countries has increased their exposure to volatile short-term inflows of capital (or "hot money") subject to frequent sudden 
18
A related view of self-insurance is that hoarding international reserves is needed to stabilize fiscal expenditures in developing countries (Aizenman and Marion 2004) . Specifically, a country characterized by volatile output, inelastic demand for fiscal outlays, high tax collection costs, and sovereign risk may want to accumulate both IR and external debt, a combination that allows the country to smooth consumption when output is volatile. This framework also suggests that greater political instability would reduce reserve accumulation, a result that is supported by the data. By implication, higher international reserves, other things being equal, may signal lower susceptibility to crisis, thereby reducing sovereign spreads.
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A similar angle is that reserve accumulation may lower real exchange rate volatility, in turn permitting a smoother output path and a potentially higher growth rate (Hviding, Nowak and Ricci (2004) , Aizenman and Riera-Crichton (2008) ). The growth literature of the 1990s identified large adverse effects of exogenous volatility on GDP and on economic growth in developing countries. An important channel transmitting or even amplifying the negative effects of such volatility would be imperfect capital markets and low levels of financial development in developing countries (Aghion et al. 2009 ). The mitigation of real exchange rate volatility through reserve accumulation would then help developing countries, as they are much more dependent on commodity trade, in both exports and the imports. Notice that the results above were obtained before the global financial crisis of 2008-09, during which emerging markets acquitted themselves remarkably well. This raises the question anew of whether reserve holdings were excessive and eventually worth it, since they helped underpin resilience during the worst global crisis since World War II. We turn to this question next, starting with a public finance perspective to crisis prevention.
A PUBLIC FINANCE APPROACH TO FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
With financial factors becoming dominant during the 1990s, the macro challenges facing developing countries went beyond navigating the trilemma triangle. More financially open, financially deeper countries, with greater exchange rate stability tended to hold more reserves.
Within the emerging market sample, the fixed exchange rate effect weakened in explaining reserve accumulation, but financial depth (measured by M2/GDP) grew in importance (Cheung and Ito (2009) , Obstfeld et al. (2010) ). Trade openness remained a robust determinant of reserve demand, though its importance diminished. The growing importance of financial factors in explaining rising international reserve-to-GDP ratios (Aizenman and Lee (2007) ) is in line with a broader self-insurance view against both external and domestic shocks. Nevertheless, as noted above, the idea that emerging markets held excessive reserves persisted.
In parallel, and somewhat schizophrenically, the feasibility of EMs being able to selfinsure against sudden stops was raised. Following the 1997-2001 crises, Caballero (2003) summarized the state-of-the-art on insuring EMs. His starting point was that countries can selfinsure against fluctuations over the business cycle; but doing so against the ruinous effects of sudden stops was not feasible because of the extreme volatility and large size of capital flows.
The necessary insurance markets and instruments did not exist: available instruments might hedge the annual fiscal revenues of a commodity-exporting country against oil or copper price risk, but not against a sudden stop. Caballero therefore proposed new instruments centered on contingent bonds targeted explicitly at exogenous shocks not under the control of emerging markets. On the reserve build up, he noted: "…these economies are self-insuring through costly accumulation of large international reserves and stabilization funds. Most individuals would be 'underinsured' if they had to leave a million dollars aside for a potential automobile collision and the liabilities that would follow, rather than buying insurance against such event; countries are no different.
Underinsurance is what greatly amplifies these countries' recessions."
Without taking a position on whether the reserve accumulation by emerging markets was excessive or not, it is important to point out that emerging markets did much more than simply build up reserves after the 1997-2001 crises. These crises did not simply change the West's perception of emerging markets (of East Asia in particular, where fiscal probity and the dominance of the private sector might have fueled complacency) but more importantly changed the perceptions of emerging markets about themselves. "Ideal" level of reserves will depend upon short-term external debt, flexibility of exchange rates and extent of currency mismatches
Source: Chapter 7, Pinto (forthcoming).
The table adds two elements to the policy trilemma: the accumulation of IR, which has been discussed above; and government's intertemporal budget constraint. IR accumulation has proceeded in tandem with measures to bolster the public finances: according to the arguments laid out in Pinto (forthcoming) reforms which lowered public indebtedness while curbing contingent liabilities from private sector balance sheets have been pivotal in establishing credibility and lowering vulnerability. The two together have buffered the move to the trilemma middle ground and facilitated financial stability. 21 The first generation crisis model honed in on the inconsistency of fiscal deficits financed by credit creation and a fixed exchange rate; the second generation on confidence crises, international liquidity and multiple equilibria; while the third brought in balance sheet exposures. Key contributions were made by Krugman (1979 Krugman ( , 1999 , Flood and Garber (1984) , Obstfeld (1994) , Chang and Velasco (2000) and Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2001) . For summaries, see Frankel and Wei (2005) and Pinto (forthcoming).
In other words, the response of emerging markets evolved into a "public finance approach" to financial integration and managing macroeconomic risk. The public finance approach has three elements: first, putting the fiscal house in order so as to create space for addressing tail risks; 22 second, recognizing from experience that good management of the public finances is not enough-costly externalities and bailout costs associated with the private (especially, financial) sector need to be factored in; and third, strengthening financial sector regulation and supervision are essential.
The efficacy of self-insurance underpinned by the public finance approach to financial integration is demonstrated by the performance of developing countries during the Great
Recession. The resilience they displayed during the 2008-09 crisis has been the ultimate litmus test, notwithstanding the skepticism about self-insurance expressed in Caballero (2003) . 23 The reason of course is that EMs went considerably beyond simply building up IR. They benefited by adopting controlled exchange rate flexibility and the active management of external balance sheet exposure by using reserves to cover short-term debt and in some cases taking steps to minimize 22 A vivid example of this policy has been Chile, where a fraction of the revenues from copper exports were saved in years when the price of copper exceeded a moving average of past years. In years when the price of copper has been below the moving average of past years, the accumulated funds have been used to buffer the fiscal expenditure of the Chile: saving in good times, dissaving in bad times, and supporting counter cyclical fiscal policy stance of Chile. Commodity-driven swings of boom and bust have defined Latin America's economic history for the past 100 years. "That is a cycle that needs to be ended," Velasco said. "We have been out to show that a Latin American country can manage properly, and not mismanage, a commodity cycle. You save in times of abundance, and you invest in lean times." [citation?] 23 Remarkably, there was not a single systemic financial sector crisis in any emerging market, even though systemic banks in some countries (e.g. Latvia, Ukraine) came under threat. 24 Emerging markets that lost at least 10% of reserves include Russia (36%), Poland (28%), Malaysia (27%), Korea (25%), India (21%), Peru (17%), Indonesia (16%), Turkey and Brazil (about 10%). See Aizenman and Sun (2009) for further discussion.
While the decoupling of EMs from the recession impacting the OECD has been elusive, emerging markets countries have became key contributors to the post-crisis global growth, led by the largest and most populous, China and India, and the other BRICS. 25 Overall, these countries adopted a heterodox approach to self-insurance, consisting of a move to the trilemma middle ground supported by reserve accumulation and underpinned by the public finance approach to financial integration, the essence of which is that the social gains from deeper financial integration should be balanced against the social costs of growing exposure to turbulence.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE PUBLIC FINANCE APPROACH
The 25 See for example, Canuto and Giugale (2010) . 26 In terms of Figure 3 
, In the absence of distortions, EMB[FI]= E[d Y(FI) /d FI ]= E[Y']; EMC[FI]= E[d FI /d FI] = 1.
Note that total expected GDP equals the trapezoid below the bold curve, EMB [FI] ; between zero and FI0. In a risk-neutral economy, policy z should be set to minimize the welfare costs of financial distortions. In such an economy, financial depth, FI/GDP, is not a goal by itself.
Financial intermediation may be too lucrative if the expected social marginal benefit of financial depth falls short of the expected social cost.
We list three policy implications of the above framework:  Too much financial intermediation may be bad for the economy. Figure 4 shows that financial intermediation was well below 5 percent during most of the 20 th century, with the exception of the decade prior to the Great Depression and Great Recessions. While correlation is not causation, the search for the gains in the performance of non financial sectors as a result of the massive increase in financial depth in the US and the global economy remains elusive.  There is a potential rivalry between the interests of the financial sector and non financial economy. Regulation level z, z = (leverage, reserve ratio, intermediation tax, etc.) should be set at a level such that the social marginal cost of FI equals the social marginal social benefit measured in relation to the nonfinancial sector.  There is a built-in bias against financial regulation: Crises prevented by tighter financial regulation are unobservable and therefore not credited to the policy maker. Yet, the cost of financial regulation is transparent and debited to the policy maker. This asymmetry means that a higher regulatory effort, while preventing crises, tends to erode support over time for future regulation (Aizenman, 2010) .
WHAT SHOULD DEVELOPING COUNTRIES DO POST GREAT RECESSION?
The massive resumption of inflows of capital to emerging markets in 2010 has strengthened the need for prudential regulations dealing with inflows of hot money. These inflows reflect both 'yield chasing' induced by the low interest rates and quantitative easing in the US and Europe, and the presumption that EMs are the new locomotive for global growth. What should emerging markets do in these circumstances?
With vulnerability endogenous to private agents' actions and behavior, optimality calls for a mixture of partial insurance and preventive methods reducing the frequency and intensity of the calamity (analogous to requiring installation of fire alarms and external lights in a house, setting speed limits for drivers, making air-bags in cars mandatory, etc, as controls or conditions for insurance provision). This logic applies equally well to the emerging markets' exposure to sudden stops and deleveraging shocks -developing countries must supplement hoarding international reserves with policies that would reduce their exposure to capital flight. Such policies could include proactive steps to place public finances on a sustainable trajectory by raising primary fiscal surpluses while simultaneously taking steps to limit contingent liabilities from private external debt and mismatches on private sector balance sheets-as indeed several important emerging markets did after 2001.
Today's challenges (a more extreme form of past challenges) are exemplified by Korea:
the Bank of Korea may hold IR as a buffer against instability associated with private banks' external borrowing, the carry trade and other activities the social benefits of which to the non financial sector may fall short of the social cost associated with the growing exposure of the taxpayer to the need to bailout systemic financial players in bad times. 27 Regulations reducing external borrowing may trim the demand for IR, increasing the overall welfare of the economy.
The public finance approach is reflected in Hyun Song Shin's statement, advising South Korea's government: "…it should tax the wholesale liabilities of the country's banks. Whenever a South
Korean bank wants to expand its loan book faster than its retail deposits, it relies on foreign 27 See Aizenman (2011) for a case study of Korea's under-regulated external exposure prior to the 2008-09 crisis, and a public finance view of optimal regulation external borrowing and hoarding of IR. See Ostry et al. (2011), Jeanne and Korinek (2011) and the references therein for further analysis of conditions conducive to the inclusion of capital controls in the policy toolkit of EMs. An interesting observation on IR and carry trade: "Countries with large stocks of international reserves and a high domestic interest rate may inadvertently be counter-parties to the carry trade. While carry-traders borrow in low interest currencies and invest in high interest currencies, most reserve building countries invest in low interest foreign currencies and borrow at the (relatively higher) domestic interest rate." Dominguez et al. (2011) . This observation is consistent with the view that the optimal accumulation of reserves should be addressed as part of a comprehensive prudential regulation that would recognize possible externalities associated with carry trade exposures.
borrowing to fill the gap. So a levy on these extra liabilities would serve to limit banks' borrowing abroad." [The Economist, November 11, 2010] .
Taxing surges in external borrowing by domestic banks is a discretionary tool that could support prudential supervision (Aizenman (2011) ). This policy tool is akin to an international version of the FDIC's policies in the US. A deposit in a bank covered by the FDIC allows the bank to expand its balance sheet, increasing the expected liabilities of the FDIC (i.e., the taxpayer) at a rate proportional to the riskiness of bank's portfolio. The insurance offered by the FDIC destroys any incentive for the saver to monitor the bank. This distortion could be dealt with by imposing a risk premium on the bank, at a rate reflecting its riskiness.
The main difference between FDIC's risk premium and external borrowing by banks in emerging markets is that the FDIC covers deposits in US dollar, and is indirectly backed by US ability to cover these liabilities by fiat money and/or domestic taxes. In contrast, external borrowing by EMs banks increases the balance sheet exposure of the country to foreign currency debt. By analogy, this exposure should be dealt by the accumulation of IR and by the proper risk premium, inducing banks to internalize the impact of external borrowing on the taxpayers' exposure to future bailouts. Ironically, economists who oppose an external borrowing tax, viewing it as an impediment to free mobility of capital, rarely support the abolition of deposit insurance!
In the meanwhile, concerns about the growing exposure of these countries to the risk associated with sudden reversal of hot money flows post 2008-09 is inducing emerging markets to adopt various regulations taxing external borrowing and hot money. These policies are not a substitute for the need to maintain fiscal and monetary discipline in EMs. Yet, short of moving to financial autarky, prudential regulations dealing with external borrowing may help in mitigating the downside risk of hot money. Table A1 provides a summary of these steps in 2010-11.
The effectiveness of prudential regulation dealing with capital flows is an important open research agenda. The well-documented experience of Chile with unremunerated reserve requirement suggests that this policy changed the composition of inflows towards longer maturities, without significantly affecting the overall volume [see Edwards (1999) ]. Focusing on the recent experience of Brazil, Forbes, Fratzscher, Kostka and Straub (2011) is an eye-opener, not just for developing countries but OECD countries as well. A key lesson is that financial regulation and integration should be defined in the context of a public finance approach, aiming at maximizing the contribution of financial intermediation to the expected performance of the economy. The goal should not be to maximize financial stability, but to choose policies balancing the expected cost of crises to the economy at the margin with the provision of efficient financial intermediation services to the non-financial sector of the economy.
29 From July 25 2011 onward, financial institutions operating in Korea are no longer allowed to buy FXdenominated bonds issued onshore by Korean companies ("Kimchi bonds") who swap proceeds into local currency. A Bank of Korea official explained the policy intent saying that "local firms should raise funds in won when they use the money here." Kimchi bond issuance had risen considerably in the months before the policy change, because all-in borrowing costs are lower than for comparable won-denominated debt. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission that government-sponsored mortgage giants, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, were the biggest sources of moral hazard, leading investors to count on a bailout for risks gone wrong [Bloomberg, Feb 18, 2010] . 31 Shiller's 2000 book (and its 2005 extended edition) explains why we should worry about the formation of bubbles in general, and in the housing market in particular. Curiously, Shiller's warning were ignored by policy makers, apparently being convinced by Greenspan's (2002) position that monetary policy should not try to lean against asset-price bubbles, but rather should just clean up after they burst. This "cleaning up" turned out to be a validation of the large costs associated with debt deflation, and the ex-post inefficiency of the foreclosure system in the US. None of these policies would probably have sufficed on its own to insulate emerging markets from global turbulence; but agile combinations of these policies provided policy makers with the needed tools to limit debilitating growth and confidence crises in EMs in the wake of the global crisis. Indeed, the limited capacity to move along the lines proposed by Caballero (2003) and the validation of the self gains from self-insurance is one of the lessons from the crisis. Selfinsurance lays bare the limitations of the global system in dealing efficiently with the global imbalances, and stresses the need for coordinating financial regulation across national borders.
By virtue of their limited internal safety nets and their relative poverty, emerging markets do not have the luxury to wait for the collective resolution of the challenges associated with global imbalances and the proliferation of under-regulated financial flows that the G20 is aiming at.
Hence, self-insurance combined with the public finance approach to financial integration may be an optimal response of emerging markets in a second best global structure. Relaxed other regulations for Thai residents which include: raising outstanding balance limits on foreign currency deposit accounts deposited with funds exchanged from commercial banks; increasing amount limit for purchase of immovable properties abroad; relaxing regulations on repatriation by raising the threshold amount above which foreign currency proceeds are required to be brought into Thailand, as well as relaxing the related reporting requirement 
